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Abstract
Through a historical analysis of corporate law reforms in the
United Kingdom (UK) during the twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, this paper traces the shrinking scope for corporations to
take socially responsible decisions. It offers a detailed examination
of the rationales and drivers of the reforms, and shows that, by
focusing exclusively on the question of accountability of directors
to shareholders, wider social concerns were “bracketed” after 1948,
leading to a permanent state of “crisis,” which constantly
threatens the legitimacy of the corporate law system. Following the
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Moore for discussions on this topic. All errors remain my own.

1001

1002

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1001 (2017)

Brexit vote, there are signs that the UK Government is willing to
reconsider its historically narrow approach to corporate law by
introducing some form of stakeholder representation. This paper
concludes that such a change would be a more effective means of
integrating social responsibility concerns into the corporate
governance process than the current constrained voluntarist
approach.
I. Introduction
This Article traces the shrinking scope of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) in UK company law from the beginning of
the twentieth century. It shows that before 1948 company
directors had broad discretion in law to balance the interests of
different corporate constituencies, but that the cumulative effect
of changes to the law since then has been to transfer ultimate
control over corporations’ CSR policies from management to
shareholders and capital markets. It concludes that shareholders
now have an effective veto over the extent to which companies
take wider interests into consideration, and suggests that this
means that CSR does not currently offer an adequate means of
internalizing externalities. If corporations are going to make a
contribution to sustainability in its environmental, social and
economic dimensions,1 there is a need for fundamental reforms to
corporate law.
The extensive debate about the function and scope of CSR
tends to occur in isolation from the legal framing of managerial
discretion within corporate law.2 Under the influence of
1. See Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade, U. OSLO (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/smart/ (last updated
Apr. 3, 2017) (last visited May 1, 2017) (detailing the possible contribution of
corporations and other market actors to the achievement of sustainability in its
three dimensions is the subject of the SMART project based at the University of
Oslo) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See, e.g., ANDREW CRANE, DIRK MATTEN & LAURA J. SPENCE, CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND CASES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 22–23 (2008)
(noting that a debate occurred whether corporations should pursue the interests
of the owners or interests of society as a whole); see also ANDREAS RÜHMKORF,
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 10–
11 (2015) (defining corporate social responsibility as “the acknowledgement by
companies that they should be accountable not only for their financial
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neoclassical law and economics, much of the literature since the
1980s has tended to assume that companies will and should only
engage in CSR activities where there is a “business case” for
doing so, but without considering the role of the law in limiting
CSR in this way.3 Lyman Johnson and David Millon’s work is an
important exception within this debate and has consistently
interrogated the narrow shareholder primacy focus of corporate
law, the social costs theis creates, and the public demand for a
wider scope of corporate law in order to ensure greater social
responsibility. For example, they identified an incipient change
with the emergence of corporate constituency states and other
state laws making hostile takeovers more difficult,4 and, more
recently, they argued that the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.5 decision clarified that state law does not require
corporations to maximize profits.6 Taking its lead from Johnson
and Millon’s work, as so many others have done since the early
1990s, this Article contributes to the debate by showing that the
scope for CSR in UK corporate law has been shrinking since the
middle of the twentieth century.
In 1993, Millon wrote of the crisis arising from the
uncertainty surrounding the normative foundations of corporate
law in the United States and ongoing challenges to the model of
shareholder primacy in particular.7 Whilst the British Parliament
performance, but also for the impact of their activities on society and/or the
environment”).
3. See Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, 12
INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 86–87 (2010), http://f2.washington.edu/fm/sites/
default/files/Business%20Case%20for%20CSR%20Review%20of%20Concepts,%2
0Research%20and%20Practice.pdf (discussing the modern take on CSR).
4. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State
Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989) (noting that state takeover
laws aim to protect non-shareholders “from the disruptive impact of the
corporate restructurings that are thought typically to result from hostile
takeover”).
5. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby,
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2014) (pointing out that on the contrary some companies
operate in accordance with “sincerely held religious beliefs and moral
principles”).
7. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993).
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consistently sought to enhance the rights and interests of
shareholders in corporate law, the crisis took longer to become
manifest, perhaps because UK scholars began to question the
normative foundations of their discipline considerably later than
their counterparts in the United States. Where challenges to
shareholder primacy did occur, as they did during the 1970s, with
demands for industrial democracy, they were headed off with
little other than cosmetic changes to the law. Nevertheless, that
UK company law is in crisis is now abundantly clear. The driver
of the crisis is the dynamic identified by Johnson, who argued
that when, corporate law brackets out wider concerns in order to
focus on one principal concern, the side effects become
destructive.8 As legislators came to focus on director and
managerial accountability to shareholders as the principal
problem for corporate law to solve, the solutions to that problem,
both within company law and in the wider corporate governance
system, resulted in the emergence of new problems, namely
corporate short-termism and a lack of meaningful social
responsibility. The side-effects of the constant pressure on
companies to produce shareholder value are becoming ever
clearer—the ongoing environmental crisis demonstrates that
sustainability cannot be achieved without a contribution from
corporate law,9 whilst the financial crisis showed that external
regulation will not protect society from excessive risk-taking in
banks whilst executive incentives and shareholder pressure
remain unchanged. Pressure is building from scholars,
practitioners, and civil society in Europe for changes so that the
corporate governance structure may be used to resolve, or at least
contribute to the resolution of, these intractable global problems
and
to
ensure
environmental,
social
and
economic
sustainability.10
8. See Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1993) (discussing the possibility that “the attempted
closure within corporate law’s modest boundaries truly is a quasi-solution
generating socially unacceptable residue problems”).
9. See generally COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin Richardson eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2015).
10. See, e.g., JEROEN VELDMAN, FILIP GREGOR & PAIGE MORROW, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT OF A GLOBAL ROUNDTABLE SERIES
6–8 (2016), http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/corporate-governance-for-a-
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This Article traces the “bracketing” effect produced by
reforms to UK corporate law, focusing on the reforms of 1948 and
2006, and the abortive reforms of the 1970s, all of which were
based on detailed public reviews of the scope of company law. The
analysis shows that shareholder primacy was not inherent in
corporate law, and that UK legislators and policy-makers worked
very hard to ensure that the shareholder interest prevailed over
the interests of other constituencies.11 It shows that one of the
key effects of the changing scope of company law has been to
transform CSR from an issue which, before 1948, fell almost
entirely within the purview of management to one which is
managerially-led, but over which shareholders and capital
markets now have an effective veto. The 1948 reforms
transformed corporate governance by giving the shareholders a
right to remove any director by simple majority, regardless of any
provisions in the company’s constitution. Five years after this
change, the hostile takeover burst onto the scene, sidelining the
previously dominant notion that managers ought to balance
competing interests and focusing their attention on meeting the
financial demands of shareholders.12 During the 1970s, pressures
for industrial democracy, and employee board-level participation
in particular, were successfully diffused in favor of a toothless
duty for directors to consider the interests of employees.13 In
2006, company law was reformed to remove any remaining
ambiguity about the meaning of “the interests of the company,”
requiring the directors to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members, the shareholders, but allowing them
changing-world_report.pdf (recommending that the content of fiduciary duties,
which include “the long-term success of the company, the focus on long-term
sustainable value creation, stakeholder interests, and systematic risk” should be
clarified in the corporation’s “governance documents, strategic objectives, and
KPIs”). But see Lorraine Talbot, Trying to Save the World with Company Law:
Some Problems, 36 LEGAL STUD. 513, 514–15 (2016) (describing a more skeptical
view on whether corporate law can contribute to achieving these pressing social
goals).
11. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (describing how § 172 of the
Companies Act 2006 mandated that directors must prioritize shareholders’
interests).
12. See infra Part II (detailing a director’s objectives and goals before
legislative reform in 1948).
13. See infra Part IV (discussing the Bullock Report and subsequent
reforms).
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to take account of a range of other interests as a means to this
end.14 Introduced at the height of belief in the great moderation
and the self-regulatory capacity of markets, the 2006 reforms
were expected to put the question of the scope of company law to
rest for a generation or more.15 However, the financial crisis of
2008, and more recently, the historic referendum vote for Britain
to leave the European Union, has called into question these
comfortable assumptions and focused attention on the social costs
which result from corporate law’s bracketing of wider interests.
In a sign that the crisis has returned, two major consultations on
corporate governance reform were launched in late 2016, the first
“focusing on executive pay, directors’ duties, and the composition
of boardrooms, including worker representation and gender
balance in executive positions,”16 the second canvassing, among
other things, different possibilities for the representation of
stakeholder interests within corporate governance.17 Post-Brexit,
there is considerable debate about the scope of corporate law in
the UK, and it is possible that significant legislative changes will
be introduced in the near future. If this happens, these changes
may make it more likely that companies act in a more socially
responsible manner, taking greater responsibility for their
impacts on society.
The Article is structured as follows: Part II discusses the
legal position before 1948. Part III looks at the reform process
from 1945–1948, and the emergence of the hostile takeover. Part
IV considers the reforms of the late 1970s. Part V explores the
14. See infra notes 145–158 and accompanying text (addressing the
consequences that the enactment of § 172 had on company law).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing how the reform only created more
questions than it solved).
16. Corporate Governance Inquiry Launch, PARLIAMENT (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commonsselect/business-energy-industrial-strategy/news-parliament-2015/corporategovernance-inquiry-launch-16-17/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Corporate Governance Inquiry—
Publications,
PARLIAMENT,
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees
/committees-a-z/commons-select/business-energy-industrialstrategy/inquiries/parliament-2015/corporate-governance-inquiry/publications/
(last visited May 1, 2017) (tracking the responses to the consultation) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See generally DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM, GREEN PAPER 34–42 (Nov. 16).
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2006 reforms. The conclusion reviews the current position and
canvasses the prospect of imminent reforms to UK corporate law.
II. The Law Before 1948
Because of its origins in partnership law, UK company law
was always understood to be shareholder-centric. The law
required that directors’ decisions be oriented towards the
interests of the company, with one judge famously stating that,
“[t]he law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but
there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for
the benefit of the company.”18 The notion of the “interests of the
company” was generally interpreted by commentators as
referring to the commercial interests of the shareholders rather
than the interests of the separate legal entity,19 although it was
clear that the law allowed the directors to take account of and
spend money on interests other than those of shareholders,
provided this was “reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the
business of the company.”20 Recently, a number of scholars have
challenged the conventional understanding of this line of case law
by arguing that the interests of the company were never defined
by the courts and that these decisions turned on the narrow point
that gratuitous payments were void for ultra vires because they
18. Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co. [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 654, 673; see also Parke
v. Daily News [1962] Ch. 927, 963 (ruling that a company could not pay
gratuities to its employees once it had agreed to sell its business and enter
liquidation).
19. See, e.g., J. E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 77 [1993] (“The correct position is thus
that the corporate entity is a vehicle for benefiting the interests of a specified
group or groups. These interests the law has traditionally defined as the
interests of the shareholders.”); see also L.S. Sealy, Directors’ “Wider”
Responsibilities—Problems, Conceptual, Practical, and Procedural, 13 MONASH
U. L. REV. 164, 165 (1987) (noting that in the Victorian times the company was
regarded as an association of members rather than a legal entity, meaning that
the company was a “they” and not “it”).
20. Hutton, 23 Ch. Div. at 671; see also Evans v Brunner, Mond & Co. Ltd.
[1921] 1 Ch. 359 (finding that a donation to fund scientific education in
universities was legal because the board deemed the donation “essential”);
Hampson v. Price’s Patent Candle Co. (1876) 45 L. J. Ch. 437 (finding that the
directors’ decision to pay a gratuitous bonus to the company’s employees was
legal).
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were not reasonably incidental to the business objectives specified
in the company’s memorandum.21 Marc Moore argues that the
correct interpretation of these cases is that “corporate funds could
legitimately be devoted to shareholders and/or employees as the
directors reasonably deemed fit for the furtherance of the
company’s constitutionally specified line(s) of business, so long as
the interests of the business as such were genuinely being
promoted in some way.”22 This is an important reinterpretation of
the case law because, as we will see next, it accords with the
broad discretion accorded to company directors by the law before
1948.
One reason why the precise contours of managerial
discretion, and, in particular, the distinction between considering
stakeholders as a means to the end of shareholder gain and
considering them as an end in themselves, were never explored
by the courts is that, in the past, it was very difficult for
shareholders to challenge managerial decisions. Provided that a
decision was not ultra vires, the courts applied a protean business
judgment rule, insisting only that decisions be taken by directors
in good faith in what they consider—not what a court may
consider—as in the interests of the company, which once again
was undefined,23 and applying a strong presumption that
decisions were taken in good faith.24 In addition, there were
21. See, e.g., Marc T. Moore, Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic
Ambivalence of UK Company Law 19 (Univ. of Cambridge Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 40/2016, 2016) (equating the court’s
decision to invalidate these payments with a court’s decision to invalidate
dividend payments when the company has no distributable profits); Jonathan
Mukwiri, Myth of Shareholder Primacy in English Law, 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV.
217, 237–238 (2013) (arguing that the “corporate governance of English public
companies is based on the entity principle”).
22. Moore, supra note 21, at 18.
23. See In re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 (concerning the
directors’ exercise of their power to refuse to register share transfers, rather
than a challenge to a managerial decision).
24. See Gresham Life (1872) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 446. The author is not aware
of any examples of cases in which a shareholder rebutted the presumption and
successfully challenged a managerial decision on this basis. In Tomkinson v.
South-Eastern Ry. Co. (1887) 35 Ch. Div. 675, a shareholder did successfully
challenge a decision by a railway company to contribute to the establishment of
the Imperial Institute in London on the grounds that this would “very probably
greatly increase the traffic of this company.” Id. However, the basis of the
decision was that this was ultra vires because it “clearly would not be a proper
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procedural restrictions on the availability of the derivative action,
which made it difficult for a shareholder to bring an action for
breach of duty against the directors.25
The combined effect of these legal doctrines and lacunae
meant that there was little pressure on directors from litigation
to manage companies exclusively with a view to producing
shareholder value. There were, however, two commonly used
constitutional mechanisms by which the directors were
encouraged to serve the ultimate interests of the shareholders.
First, it was common to include a requirement that directors
hold qualification shares, and there is no doubt that this brought
the interests of shareholders into greater focus.26
Second, the shareholders could remove the directors in
accordance with the company’s articles, although by default this
required a special resolution—75% of the votes cast in the general
meeting—something that would normally be very difficult to
achieve.27 Company constitutions also commonly further
application of the moneys of a railway company.” Id. The judge commented that
to argue that “any expenditure which may indirectly conduce to the benefit of
the company is intra vires, seems to me extravagant.” Id.
25. See, e.g., Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 463 (finding that
corporations should normally sue in their own name, but that an exception may
be made in the interests of justice where there is ‘injury to a corporation by
some of its members, for which no adequate remedy remained’); Atwool v.
Merryweather (1867) 5 Eq. 464, 467 (developing the possible exception by
finding that “‘it would not be competent for a majority of the shareholders
against a minority’ to sanction a fraudulent transaction”).
26. See Gareth Campbell & John D. Turner, Substitutes for Legal
Protection: Corporate Governance and Dividends in Victorian Britain, 64 ECON.
HIST. REV. 571, 582 (2011) (noting that the majority of companies placed share
qualifications upon their directors).
27. See PALMER, supra note 26, at 195–97 (noting that the default rule
provided by Table A was that directors could only be removed by special
resolution (Art 65 Table A 1862) or extraordinary resolution (Art 86 Table A
1906; Art 80 Table A 1929), both types of resolution requiring the support of
seventy-five percent of those entitled to vote and actually voting in person or by
proxy). A special resolution also required a second meeting to confirm the
decision by simple majority until 1929. See id. at 193 (dispensing with the
requirement of a second meeting for a special resolution). Shareholders in listed
companies were not necessarily in a better position; even by 1945, the London
Stock Exchange only required that all directors of listed companies could be
removed by extraordinary resolution. Minutes of Evidence Before the Cohen
Committee, Appendix X at 350; see also Lance Davis, Larry Neal & Eugene N.
White, How It All Began: The Rise of Listing Requirements on the London,
Berlin, Paris, and New York Stock Exchanges, 38 INT’L J. ACCT. 117, 135 (setting
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weakened the accountability of directors to shareholders because
of the default rule, going back to the Joint Stock Companies Act
1844, that boards were “staggered” with one third of the directors
required to retire each year but available for re-election.28
Shareholders who wanted to remove directors outside of this cycle
had to muster support for an extraordinary resolution, which was
difficult because the directors themselves tended to hold all the
proxies for the general meeting.29 Completing the picture of
strong managerial discretion, coupled with peripheral and weak
shareholders, was the courts’ refusal to allow the shareholders to
give instructions to the directors by simple majority.30
Hence, directors and managers had very broad discretion in
law, and this discretion widened further from the beginning of
the twentieth century as shareholders gradually became more
dispersed, whilst directors increasingly delegated management to
professional managers.31 Some five years before Berle and Means’
seminal analysis of the United States, Keynes remarked upon a
“most interesting and unnoticed”32 development in the largest
companies, in “which the owners of the capital, i.e. its
shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the
management with the result that the direct personal interest of

out the early rules and regulations of the London Stock Exchange).
28. Companies Act 1862, tbl. A, arts. 58 & 60 (UK); Companies Act 1906,
tbl. A, arts 78 & 80 (UK); Companies Act 1929, tbl. A, arts. 73 & 75 (UK).
29. Observation of Justice Cohen in minutes of evidence before the Cohen
Committee, para. 7071. Minutes of evidence taken before the Company Law
Amendment Committee, 17th September 1943–24th November 1944 (HMSO,
1943–1944).
30. See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame
(1906) 2 Ch. 34, § IV (noting that if certain powers are given to directors, then
shareholders cannot interfere with “the exercise of those powers”); Gramophone
& Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley (1908) 2 K.B. 89, 105–106 (“The directors are not
servants to obey directions given by the shareholders as individuals; . . . They
are persons who may by the regulations be entrusted with the control of the
business, and if so entrusted they can be dispossessed from that control only by
the statutory majority which can alter the articles.”).
31. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE (1926) (noting that
there comes a point in the company’s existence during which directors “are
entirely dissociated from the management” because the company grew too large,
and at that point directors begin to look at outside professional help).
32. Id.
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the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite
secondary”33 so that enterprises were becoming socialized.34
The emergence of professionalized management during the
first half of the twentieth century had brought with it an ideology
of control, which asserted that the function of management was
to balance competing interests within the corporate enterprise.
Beginning with technical discussions of the role of the manager in
guiding production,35 this ideology quickly developed into the
doctrine of scientific management, perhaps most closely
associated with Taylor,36 and the ideology received the seal of
approval of the British government in 1919, in large part because
it promised to tame the conflict between labor and capital.37 At
the same time, the idea began to emerge that management was
developing into a profession,38 an impartial leadership group
33. Id.
34. See id. (noting that when this stage is reached, directors consider with
more regard the reputation of the institution than they consider the
maximization of profit for the shareholders).
35. See FRANCIS G. BURTON, THE COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT OF
ENGINEERING WORKS 20–25 (1899) (describing that the role of the manager
cannot be defined because “he is an autocrat, controlling and directing everyone
connected with the concern”); see also J. SLATER LEWIS, THE COMMERCIAL
ORGANISATION OF FACTORIES 7–11 (1896) (detailing the qualifications and
necessary responsibilities of a manager).
36. See FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
7–11 (1911) (arguing that the remedy for inefficiency, which affects society, lies
in systematic management).
37. See Scientific Business Management, Reconstruction Problems 28,
Ministry of Reconstruction (HMSO, London 1919) (emphasizing the human
aspects of management noting “Taylor’s cardinal principle of a mental
revolution in employer and worker alike and of their mutuality of interest.”
Managers should “guide and stimulate them [the employees] towards a higher
standard of intellectuality and efficiency in life” and ”cultivate the personal
interest of the workers.”)
38. See, e.g., SIDNEY WEBB, THE WORKS MANAGER TO-DAY: AN ADDRESS
PREPARED FOR A SERIES OF PRIVATE GATHERINGS OF WORKS MANAGERS 4–5 (1918)
(“In large establishments it demands the undivided attention, not only of one
person but of a whole class; and we see evolved specialised and differentiated
hierarchy . . . .”). Webb recognized that “the profession of the manager, under
whatever designation, is destined, with the ever increasing complication of
man’s enterprises, to develop a steadily increasing technique and a more and
more specialised vocational training of its own.” Id. at 8. A similar current of
thought was developing in the United States. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 1–6 (1914) (defining an occupation as a profession
where it requires intellectual training, “is pursued largely for others and not
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which would produce “an actual and living organism in which
each living unit is compelled, and is glad to be compelled, to offer
his best,”39 and a public service obligation.40 Industrialists, such
as Seebohm Rowntree, as well as early management theorists,
saw managers as holding a balance between labor and capital in
pursuit of public or social responsibility.41 When Berle and Means
concluded that the control of the great corporations might
“develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of
claims by various groups in the community,”42 they were
reflecting the previous forty years of debate about the role of
management in productive enterprise, debates that had occurred
in parallel in the US and the UK. This conception of management
became widely accepted,43 and as late as 1955, Gower commented
that “it has become almost an accepted dogma that management
owed duties to ‘the four parties to industry’ (labor, capital,
management, and the community)—a dogma which is repeated
merely for one’s self” and in which “the amount of financial return is not the
accepted measure of success”).
39. JOHN LEE, MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 16
(1921).
40. See R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 122–23 (1921) (using
agriculture as an example to show that the small capital required for
agriculture makes it possible for a group of workers to offer their services to the
public “without the intervention of an employer”). For industry to be organized
as a profession, “it should cease to be conducted by the agents of
property-owners for the advantage of property-owners, and should be carried on,
instead, for the service of the public” and “the responsibility for the maintenance
of the service should rest upon the shoulders of those, from organizer and
scientist to labourer, by whom, in effect, the work is conducted.” Id. at 111.
Similar debates were occurring in the United States during the first three
decades of the twentieth century. See, e.g., ALLEN KAUFMAN, LAWRENCE
ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 114–17 (1995); see also Mary
O’Sullivan, CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 100–02 (2000) (describing the
evolution of these debates in the United States).
41. See JOHN CHILD, BRITISH MANAGEMENT THOUGHT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
52–53 (1969) (arguing that a professional claim for management developed,
which included the concept of impartiality in the “pursuit of a public or social
responsibility”).
42. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1991).
43. See Paul Bircher, Company Law Reform and the Board of Trade, 18
ACCT. & BUS. RES. 107, 117 (2012) (“[T]he rapidly developing sense that industry
is less a matter of the adventuring of private money for profit than the
rendering of a public service to the commonwealth.”).
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indiscriminately in the speeches of right-wing company chairmen
and left-wing politicians.”44
These wider social responsibilities of management were
never enshrined in UK corporate law, but were not clearly
incompatible with it, and the outer limits of the law were never
tested before the courts. While directors were under a duty to act
intra vires and in good faith in the interests of the company, these
elastic notions certainly accommodated any socially responsible
decision-making that was capable of producing returns for the
shareholders, and, as discussed above, may well have gone
further.
III. The Company Law Reforms of 1948
This was the background against which, in 1943, a
Committee on Company Law Amendment (known as the Cohen
Committee after its chairman) was appointed to review the UK’s
system of company law.45 The Cohen Committee was asked “to
consider and report what major amendments are desirable in the
Companies Act, 1929, and, in particular, to review the
requirements prescribed in regard to the formation and affairs of
companies and the safeguards afforded for investors and for the
public interest.”46 However, the Committee focused most of its
attention on the protection of shareholders,47 and there was no
explicit consideration of how the law could provide further
safeguards for the public interest. Its 1945 Report recommended
many significant changes to company law, including modernizing
accounting, prohibiting the use of hidden reserves (so making
share prices more reliable), and introducing a new remedy for

44. L. C. B. Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 1176, 1190 (1955).
45. See BD. OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW
AMENDMENT 7–8 (Cmd. 6659 1943), http://reports.mca.gov.in/Reports/17Justice%20Cohen%20committee%20report%20of%20the%20committee%20on%2
0company%20law%20amendment,%201943.pdf (detailing general economic
policy as it relates to company law).
46. Id. at 7.
47. See id. at 10–12 (noting that ultra vires protection has proven to be
illusory for shareholders).

1014

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1001 (2017)

minority shareholders.48 However, for our purposes, its most
important innovation related to the relationship between
shareholders and directors. The Cohen committee was influenced
strongly by the emergent separation of ownership and control,
and expressed concern that shareholder control had become
illusory as “small shareholders who pay little attention to their
investments so long as satisfactory dividends are forthcoming.”49
Key members of the Committee, such as the Chairman, Mr.
Justice Cohen, and Professor Goodhart, simply assumed that
shareholders ought to have more control over directors.50 The
Committee ultimately concluded that it was “desirable to give
shareholders greater powers to remove directors with whom they
are dissatisfied, than they have at present”51 and proposed to
introduce “a provision, overriding anything to the contrary in the
articles of a company, that any director, whether under a service
contract or not, should be removable by an ordinary resolution,
without prejudice to any contractual right for compensation.”52
This change generated little debate in Parliament or in the
academic literature,53 and the Labour Party, which was focused
48. See id. at 72.
“We propose that the accounts of subsidiaries should be required as
far as practicable to be consolidated with, and to be made up to the
same date as, the accounts of the holding company, but that there
should be excluded the accounts of subsidiaries which in the opinion
of the directors of the holding company it would be impracticable or
misleading to consolidate.”
49. Id. at 9.
50. See Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Company Law Amendment
Committee, 17th September 1943–24th November 1944 (HMSO, 1943–1944). For
example, Cohen commented that “[t]he view upon which company law is based, I
think, is that the shareholders elect the directors to conduct their business”
(para. 7038) and asked “[i]s it not reasonable prima facie that the shareholders
out of whose money the remuneration comes, should know what the directors
are receiving?” (para. 9741). He also asked whether those upon whom the first
loss falls should have greater control (para. 10205). Similarly, Goodhart
observed that he considered “the question of shareholders’ control” to be “really
the most important point in company law,” because “in theory the shareholders
have complete control through electing the directors.” (para. 9479).
51. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT, supra note
45, at 79.
52. Id. at 80.
53. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Report of the Committee on Company Law
Amendment, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1258–1265 (1945) (suggesting that one of the
major flaws of American corporate law “is the failure to devise an effective
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on its plans to nationalize swathes of British industry, barely
engaged with the process of company law reform.54 Yet, it is no
exaggeration to state that the Companies Act 1948 ushered in the
modern era of financialized shareholder primacy corporate
governance. Before 1948, the hostile takeover was virtually
unknown because there were significant obstacles to takeover
bids that bypassed the board of directors and were addressed
directly to the shareholders.55 The bidder had to offer a very high
price so that “the directors could not say that the bid was
inadequate.”56 Shareholders, who had little reliable information
about the company’s financial position, tended to follow the
recommendation of the directors as to whether to accept a bid
from an outsider.57 Most significantly, there was a fundamental
asymmetry between incumbent directors who only had to control
directly or through other supportive shareholders 25% of the
shares in order to prevent a bid of which they did not approve and
bidders who had to acquire 75% of the shares to take control of
the general meeting and change the board.58 As a result,
remedy for misconduct on the part of those in control of a corporation”); O.
Kahn-Freund, Company Law Reform: A Review of the Report of the Committee
on Company Law Amendment, 9 MOD. L. REV. 235, 238 (1946) (“The Committee
did not embark upon an investigation of the corporate entity principle as such
and of its implications.”).
54. See Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael Harris, The Labour Party and
the Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 51, 63–64 (John E.
Parkinson et al. ed., 2000).
55. See James B. Tabb, Accountancy Aspects of the Takeover Bids in
Britain 1945–1965 2 (Jan. 1, 1968) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Sheffield) (citing the technique used by George Hudson, nineteenth century
railway owner, who would select “a railway company with declining profits,
purchase shares or stock in the company and attend a general meeting where he
would expound a scheme to increase the company’s profits if the shareholders
would replace the existing board”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
56. Id. at 11.
57. See id. at 1 (“Directors not wishing their companies to be taken over
have developed a variety of defensive measures . . . steps taken before a bid has
been made for the company and ad hoc measures to stave off an actual offer.”).
58. See PALMER, supra note 26, at 195–197 (noting that the default rule
provided by Table A was that directors could only be removed by special
resolution (Art 65 Table A 1862) or extraordinary resolution (Art 86 Table A
1906; Art 80 Table A 1929), both types of resolution requiring the support of
seventy-five percent of those entitled to vote and actually voting in person or by
proxy).

1016

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1001 (2017)

consensual mergers were the norm, and hostile takeovers were
virtually unheard of. Where they did occur, they were motivated
by an industrial, and generally anticompetitive, logic.59
However, from the early 1950s, shortly after the
implementation of the Cohen Committee’s reforms in the form of
§ 184 Companies Act 1948, a wave of hostile takeovers struck
British companies.60 Indeed, between 1948 and 1961, 25% of
companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange were taken over
by other quoted companies.61 By leveling the playing field
between incumbents and outsiders, the 1948 changes completely
changed the dynamics of takeovers by making it much more
difficult for company directors to resist takeovers and opening up
a wide range of companies to hostile takeover for the first time.
The threat of hostile takeover changed managerial practices very
quickly. Whilst some companies took defensive measures,62
others tried to persuade their shareholders not to sell their
shares by increasing the dividend, 63 or by taking actions similar
to that of a bidder, such as selling off the company’s freeholds to
an insurance company and leasing them back.64
Although Hannah has emphasized the importance of the
accounting regime in allowing bidders to identify suitable
targets,65 the argument above suggests that § 184 played a key
role in allowing the hostile takeover to become an established
59. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 12 (noting that a rare hostile takeover
occurred in 1920, when Lever, who had failed to persuade his competitors to
form a cartel with him, made an offer so generous that the board of John Knight
Ltd. felt compelled to recommend that their shareholders accept).
60. See GEORGE BULL & ANTHONY VICE, BID FOR POWER 29–32 (1961)
(describing how Charles Clore launched the first hostile takeover bids in 1953
for the Savoy Hotel and Sears).
61. Les Hannah, Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950: An Exercise in
Business ‘Pre-History’, 16 BUS. HIST. 65, 67 (2006).
62. See BULL & VICE, supra note 60, at 35–38 (explaining how the directors
of Savoy Hotel Ltd. sought to frustrate Clore’s bid by preventing him from
changing the use of the Berkeley Hotel).
63. See id. at 21 (showing that there was a small but significant increase in
the percentage and quantity of payments of profits to shareholders between
1953 and 1956).
64. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 62 (describing the case of Waterlow & Sons
Ltd. in 1962 that sold off its head office and distributed the proceeds to
shareholders in order to head off an unwelcome takeover).
65. See generally Hannah, supra note 61.
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practice. Whilst there was significant opposition at first, its
legitimacy was no longer questioned by policy-makers after the
mid-1950s.66 It gradually gained approval, first from
commentators,67 then from the City of London and the Bank of
England.68 In 1962, the Jenkins Committee,69 which conducted
another of the UK’s periodic reviews of company law, also gave
broad approval to takeovers as “an essential feature of economic
growth and development” and a “convenient method of
amalgamation.”70 A minority of that Committee, led by Gower—
the leading company law professor at the time—added the
further gloss that takeovers were a spur to managerial
efficiency.71 By 1963, the efficiency-enhancing effects of takeovers
were beginning to be theorized by economists72 and, in 1965,

66. See David Chambers, The City and the Corporate Economy Since 1970,
in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 255, 267 (Floud et
al. ed., 2014) (noting both how the government and the Bank of England
initially expressed opposition to hostile takeovers and how companies struggled
to obtain finances to expand; therefore, the takeover technique was slow to
spread).
67. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 256 (citing an argument by The Economist
that directors using the company’s resources for the best economic return were
immune from takeover, and that bidders making better use of those resources
would “generally be performing an economic service to the community”); see also
Gower, supra note 44, at 1396 (describing the takeover mechanism as “useful”);
see also BULL & VICE, supra note 60, at 26–27 (backing the argument that “the
bidder makes the most efficient use of a company’s assets,” whilst “many boards
in the past have tended to adopt excessively long-term schedules.”).
68. See Richard Roberts, Regulatory Responses to the Rise of the Market for
Corporate Control in Britain in the 1950s, 34 BUS. HIST. 183, 187–91 (2006) (UK)
(describing that in 1953, the Bank of England had expressed opposition to the
emerging hostile takeover, but by 1958 gave its approval).
69. REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749 (UK).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 209 (noting that “efficient directors who have treated their
shareholders fairly and frankly should have little to fear from a raider” and they
should not be allowed to protect themselves against this remote risk by issuing
non-voting shares and “converting themselves into a self-perpetuating
oligarchy”).
72. See Robin Marris, A Model of the “Managerial” Enterprise, 77(2) Q.J.
ECON. 185, 190 (1963) (UK) (recognizing that the takeover was an essential
means by which management control over the firm’s resources could be loosened
and transferred to a more efficient controller).
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Manne developed the notion of the market for corporate control in
the United States.73
The Cohen Committee’s changes greatly limited the scope for
corporate social responsibility. Whilst managers still had
considerable legal latitude to take account of, or balance, a range
of social interests, they were in practice subject to considerable
market pressure to prioritize returns to shareholders. The result
was that social responsibility initiatives were only possible where
they did not affect the market price of the company’s shares,
opening the company to the threat of hostile takeover. Whilst
managers were much less vocal about their social responsibilities
after the effects of the 1948 changes became clear, we will see in
the next section that social expectations regarding corporate
responsibility did not go away; they simply changed form.
IV. 1970s Industrial Democracy Reforms
This Part traces how political pressure for industrial
democracy during the 1970s ultimately resulted only in a
toothless duty requiring directors to consider the interests of
employees. Wedderburn notes that the British debate about
corporate social responsibility “became in the 1970s a debate
mainly about ‘industrial democracy.’”74 However, industrial
democracy was “a banner carried not only by varied but often
opposed groups,”75 comprising a variety of different demands,
ranging from greater trade union involvement in decisions,76 to
73. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73
J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (“A fundamental premise underlying the market
for corporate control is the existence of a high positive correlation between
corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that
company.”).
74. Lord Wedderburn, The Legal Development of Corporate Responsibility:
For Whom will Corporate Managers be Trustees?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 3, 32–33 (Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., De
Gruyter 1985).
75. Robert Kilroy-Silk, Contemporary Theories of Industrial Democracy, 41
POL. Q. 169, 180 (1970).
76. See Wedderburn, supra note 74, at 34–35. However, the Labour Party
in 1967 insisted that industrial democracy should be achieved through a single
channel of representation, that is, trade unions, with participation in a wider
range of decisions based on information and recognition. See generally LABOUR
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experiments with worker representatives on boards,77 to legally
mandated worker directors.78
Under the Conservative government of the early 1970s, the
strong opposition to industrial democracy on the part of
management and the financial sector found expression in the
Confederation of British Industry’s Watkinson Report.79 The
group had been asked to “examine factors which might be
expected to assist the direction and control of public companies,
examine the role, responsibilities and structure of boards of
public companies” and “consider corporate behaviour towards
interests other than those of the shareholders and providers of
finance, including employees, creditors, customers and the
community at large.”80 Given the UK’s accession to the EEC in
1973, the report strongly opposed the proposed Fifth Company
Law Directive, which threatened to mandate German-style
co-determination for all large companies.81 More importantly, it
laid down a blueprint for both corporate governance and
corporate social responsibility, which acted as a starting point for
the Cadbury Committee,82 and so has endured to the present day.
PARTY, REPORT OF THE LABOUR PARTY WORKING PARTY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
(1967).
77. See DONOVAN, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNION AND
EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS, 1968, Cmnd. 3623, at para 1004 (UK) [hereinafter
DONOVAN REPORT] (detailing the recommendations of a minority to the Donovan
Report). The Labour Government stated in January 1969 that it favored
experiments with appointment of worker representatives to boards and would
hold consultations as to how they might be facilitated. See IN PLACE OF STRIFE: A
POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1969, Cmnd. 3888, at para 49 (UK).
78. See DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 77, para 1005, (a minority of the
Committee calling for legislation that requires at least two workers’ directors to
act as “guardians of the workers’ interest at the stage when company policy is
being formulated . . . and should in all other respects exercise the rights and
responsibilities of non-executive directors of companies to which they are
appointed”).
79. See generally CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., A NEW LOOK AT THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC COMPANY: AN INTERIM REPORT FOR
DISCUSSION (1973) [hereinafter WATKINSON REPORT].
80. Id. at 1.
81. See id. at 3 (proposing instead a two-tier board of directors). In large
part as a result of British opposition, the Fifth Company Law Directive was
never introduced.
82. See Minutes of the Second Meeting of the CBI Steering Group on LongTermism and Corporate Governance, CBI, http://cadbury.cjbs.archios.
info/_media/files/CAD-01077.pdf (recording that Sir Adrian Cadbury stated that
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It started from the (legally incorrect) premise that “companies are
legally owned by their shareholders” and so “the paramount
interest of the company must continue to be to serve the long
term interests of the shareholders.”83 It recommended including
non-executive directors on corporate boards as a means of
bringing an outside perspective to the company and of reassuring
shareholders and called for action be taken to encourage this.84
However, out of enlightened self-interest and to ensure corporate
integrity, directors should consider all relevant interests,
including shareholders, employees, customers, creditors and the
public,85 and should give more publicity to the fact that “they
spend time and money on the public interest in ways not required
by law and not offering early financial benefit.”86 These
recommendations were reflected in a 1973 White Paper, which
also recognized that company directors should “on behalf of the
shareholders . . . discharge their social responsibilities” and
therefore “have a manifest obligation towards all those with
whom they have dealings—and none more so than the employees
of the company.”87 Whilst a Green Paper was promised to address

the Watkinson Report was “a useful starting point for his own study,” and that
he asked the CBI Steering Group to suggest “a working definition of the term
‘corporate governance’”).
83. WATKINSON REPORT, supra note 79, at 5.
84. See id. at 13 (stating that the arguments in favor of including nonexecutive directors onto boards should be given wider publicity). This paralleled
the SEC’s drive for more non-executives during the early 1970s. In the UK, a
number of private member’s bills sought, between 1971 and 1976, to introduce
this as a legal requirement. For example: “A bill to require certain companies to
appoint non-executive directors; to require such directors jointly to present
independent annual reports to the shareholders; and for purposes connected
therewith.” 20th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, 197–1972, Vol. I,
at 385. Rhys Williams repeatedly sought to reintroduce his bill in the years that
followed. See, e.g., 26 March 1975, Parl Deb HC vol. 889 (UK) at 509.
85. See id. at 6 (defining “enlightened self interest” as a balance between
the company’s interests and that of others “in a way that a man of integrity and
good will would do in the conduct of his own private business”); see also id. at
16–17 (noting that each member of a board must consider interests such as
those “of shareholders, of all employees, of customers, of creditors and the
public”).
86. Id. at 24.
87. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW REFORM, 1973,
Cmnd. 5391, at 5 (UK).
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the question of employee participation, it appears that this was
never published.
With the re-election of a Labour Government in 1975, the
pendulum apparently swung away from voluntary CSR and back
towards employee representation, as the Bullock Committee was
appointed with the mandate to consider how a “radical extension
of industrial democracy into the control of companies by means of
representation on boards of directors” could best be achieved.88 It
ultimately recommended a 2x+y formulation, with shareholders
and employees each appointing x directors, and the two groups
jointly appointing y expert, co-opted directors.89 This would allow
for deadlocks to be broken, but more importantly, the co-opted
directors would bring the benefits of NEDs, in terms of external
perspective, to the codetermined board.90 It recommended that
codetermination should take place on a unitary board, provided
that a sufficient majority of employees voted for it.91 A dissenting
minority preferred to recommend a two-tier system, with the
supervisory board consisting of one third each of employee
representatives, shareholder representatives, and independent
members.92
Alongside this recommendation, the Report also suggested
that “all directors should continue to be required to act in the best
interests of the company, but that in doing so they should take
into account the interests of the company’s employees as well as
88. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1977, Cmnd. 6706 (UK) [hereinafter BULLOCK REPORT].
See James Moher & Alastair Reid, Democracy in the Workplace—The Bullock
Report
Revisited,
HIST.
&
POL’Y
(June
9,
2010),
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/trade-union-forum/meeting/democracy-in-theworkplace-the-bullock-report-revisited (last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing the
historical background leading up to the Bullock Committee) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See id. (balancing the ideologies of the trade unions and the
shareholders).
90. See BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 88, at 97, 98 (discussing the
advantages of the Committee’s recommendations in terms of avoiding
shareholder factions and deadlock).
91. See id. at 161 (“[W]e believe that all employees should be involved in a
ballot and that if a sufficient majority is obtained, then the process of
reconstituting the board should take place.”).
92. See id. at 178 (detailing the Dissent’s proposed composition of the
Supervisory Board).
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its shareholders.”93 This reform was considered “long overdue,
whether or not employee representatives are put on boards.”94
This proposed change reflected the Committee’s understanding
that the role of company directors was one of “balancing a
number of interests.”95 This would not change when employees
were represented on boards, and directors would still be required
“to weigh up the differing and conflicting interests in the
company in order to reach decisions which they genuinely believe
to be in the company’s overall best interest.”96
The UK Labour Government responded to Bullock in a 1978
White Paper emphasizing the importance of giving employees “a
share in the decisions within their company or firm, and
therefore a share in the responsibility for making it a success”
because this would replace “defensive co-existence” with a
“positive partnership between management and workers.”97 It
proposed to make a two-tier board an option, with employee and
shareholder representatives on the “policy board” setting pay,
monitoring performance, supervising the financial affairs and so
on, whilst day-to-day management would be carried out by the
management board.98 The precise scope of employee participation
was to be determined through negotiations, with a statutory right
to board level representation in companies employing more than
2,000 employees where no agreement was reached after a number
of years.99 As for the composition of the board, it suggested that,
in light of ongoing disagreements, “[a] reasonable first step would
93. Id. at 84.
94. Id. at 62. Similar proposals had been made in the abortive Companies
Bills of 1973 (permissive) and 1976 and in the Industrial Democracy Bill 1975,
which would have required directors to consider employee interests, as well as
employee representation on boards. Whilst this bill had strong support, it was
aborted when the government announced its intention to introduce legislation
on industrial democracy in 1976–77. See Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael
Harris, The Labour Party and the Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
COMPANY 51, 75 (John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly eds., 2000)
(providing the political history of various Companies Bills).
95. BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 88, at 85.
96. Id.
97. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1978, Cmnd. 7231, ¶ 1 (UK).
98. See id. ¶ 24 (outlining the proposed two-tiered board structure).
99. See id. ¶¶ 26–27 (proposing a structure of employee board participation
and a three to four-year timeframe in which these decisions should be made).
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be to give employees the right to appoint up to one third of the
members of the policy board in the proposed two tier system.”100
These proposals fell off the agenda during the Winter of
Discontent of 1978–79, and the Labour Government was replaced
by a Conservative one in 1979.101 However, the proposal to
require directors to consider employee interests remained live.
The proposal had been included in a proposed statutory
statement of directors’ duties,102 and in the Companies Bill 1978,
which envisaged the provision operating as a safe harbor for
company directors in proceedings for breach of duty, although it
never became law.103 Despite the change of government, the
provision was introduced as Section 46(1) of the Companies Act
1980, which ultimately became Section 309(1) of Companies Act
1985. It stated that:
100. Id. ¶ 32. This essentially adopted the position taken by the minority in
the Bullock Report, and was driven by rifts within the Labour Party as to the
effect of industrial democracy on business confidence. See Jim Phillips,
Transactions, Interaction and Inaction: Industrial Democracy in the UK in the
1970s, 18 EUR. BUS. HIST. ASS’N CONF., FRANKFURT, GER. (2008),
http://www.ebha.org/ebha2008/papers/Phillips_ebha_2008.pdf
(“Bullock’s
remnants were duly lost amid the political, economic and industrial turbulence
of the 1978–9 ‘Winter of Discontent’ . . . .”).
101. See Phillips, supra note 100, at 18–19 (“[T]he political discrediting of
the Labour government and its defeat to Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative
party in the 1979 General Election, can be traced directly to the abandonment of
the industrial democracy agenda . . . .”).
102. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS,
1977, Cmnd. 7037, ¶ 5 (UK) (“The statutory definition of the duty of directors
will require directors to take into account the interests of employees as well as
of shareholders.”).
103. See Companies Bill 1978, HL Bill [2 47/5] cl. 46(2) (Gr. Brit)
Where in any proceedings it falls to a court to determine whether a
director of a company is in breach of his duty to have regard, in the
performance of his functions, to the interests of the company’s
members, the court shall take into account the fact that the director
is also required to comply with the duty imposed by this section.
As Lord Mishcon explained in the House of Lords:
The section was “deemed to be a shield for the directors and not a
spear. In other words . . . if a director is criticised, indeed is attacked
in the courts, for not having fulfilled duties to the members of the
company solely in their interests because he has taken into account
the interests of employees, which may slightly or substantially
derogate in a certain case from the interests of the members, it shall
be taken into account that the director had this statutory duty.
407 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1980) cols. 1017–27, at 1021–22 (UK).
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The matters to which the directors of a company are to have
regard in the performance of their functions include the
interests of the company's employees in general, as well as the
interests of its members.104

However, the provision was weakened with the omission of the
safe harbor provision, leaving only a duty owed to, and
enforceable by, the company.105 The Government explained that it
was concerned not to “open up an easy route for frivolous or
obstructive actions in the courts,” and that it viewed the section
as declaratory of existing best practice.106 Sealy later commented
that the section was introduced “perhaps in an attempt to
appease the pressure for more comprehensive reform.”107
Section 309 did not have much impact on the wider
landscape of corporate law. Whilst it broadened the definition of
the “interests of the company,” giving the directors greater
protection against shareholder claims of unfair prejudice or
unlawful financial assistance,108 no director ever faced liability for
failing to consider the interests of employees. Various reasons
may be suggested for this.
Since the duty was owed to the company, employees faced
enforcement problems.109 In addition, there were doubts about
104. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 309(1) (repealed 2007) (UK).
105. See id. § 309(2) (providing that “the duty imposed by this section on the
directors is owed by them to the company (and the company alone) and is
enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by
its directors”).
106. 972 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1979) cols. 52–160, at 62 (UK). Cecil
Parkinson stated that the section would “confirm the care with which
responsible boards already consider the interests of their employees and act as
an encouragement for others to do the same.” Id.
107. L. S. Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities—Problems Conceptual,
Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 171 (1987).
108. The courts recognized that the directors’ duty to act in the “interests of
the company” had been broadened by Section 309 so that “the company is more
than just the sum total of its members.” Fulham Football Club Ltd. v. Cabra
Estates plc [1992] 1 BCLC 363, 379 (Gr. Brit.); see also Brady v. Brady [1989]
AC 755, 778 (UK) (describing the term “purpose” as capable of “several different
meanings” in the Companies Act 1985 (UK)). In In re Saul D Harrison & Sons
plc [1994] BCC 475, 483 (UK), the Court of Appeal held that the directors of a
struggling company were lawfully entitled, among other things, to take account
of the benefits to employees of the business continuing alongside the interest of
the shareholders in the company becoming profitable.
109. The difficulties of enforcement were quickly recognized by
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whether a remedy could realistically be ordered,110 and Villiers
suggests that the obligation was merely procedural, requiring the
directors to consider employee interests, but allowing them to
disregard them where they were “not compatible with the
company’s or shareholders’ interests.”111 Finally, as we saw
above, the courts had long taken an approach akin to that
embodied in the business judgment rule and rarely called into
question the substance of corporate decision-making.112
Beyond these important considerations, it is submitted that
the main reason that Section 309 did not produce any meaningful
effect on the way companies are governed was that it did not
operate in the hostile takeover context. Unlike the corporate
constituency statutes introduced at state level in the late 1980s,
commentators. Prentice thought that employees would have to enforce the duty
by becoming shareholders. See D. D. Prentice, A Company and Its Employees;
The Companies Act 1980, 10 INDUS. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1981) (discussing shareholder
power over directors compared to employees). Even if they became shareholders,
they would have to contend with the complexities of the judge-made rules
regulating the derivative action (i.e., it would be unlikely that the majority of
independent shareholders would support an action against the directors or that
the wrong would be unratifiable). See Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman
Industries (No. 2) [1982] Ch. 204, 222–23 (describing challenges individual
shareholders face when bringing suits against directors); Smith v. Croft (No. 2)
[1988] Ch. 114, 120 (discussing the difficulty in forming consensus between
various groups of shareholders with divergent interests). For further discussion
of this point, see Charlotte Villiers, Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985: Is it
Time for a Reappraisal?, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION
593, 596–97 (Hugh Collins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds., Kluwer Law Int’l.
2000).
110. Sealy recognized that this was a duty without a corresponding remedy,
so that the section was “empty.” See Sealy, supra note 107, at 177 (asking what
a court could “be asked to do for them, supposing that it is established that
insufficient regard has been had to their interests”). Prentice suggested that the
only suitable remedy appeared to be the courts ordering the directors to
reconsider their decision, something akin to an administrative law remedy. See
Prentice, supra note 109, at 5 (“If the action is timeous, probably the only
remedial option open to the courts will be an order that the directors reconsider
their decision taking into consideration the employees’ interests.”).
111. Villiers, supra note 109, at 595–96.
112. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (describing historical
latitude applied to cases involving the business judgment rule). If the decision
was taken in good faith (which was strongly presumed), and the directors could
show that they had had “regard to” the interests of employees, this would
certainly suffice to exonerate them from any claim for breach of duty to the
company.
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which Johnson and Millon viewed as aiming “to displace the
standard but now inadequate narrative,”113 both in the takeover
context and beyond,114 Section 309 had no effect in relation to
hostile takeovers, as directors’ ability to contest takeovers was
always hamstrung. In addressing the legality of any defensive
response to an unwelcome takeover, the common law focused on
the purpose for which directors made decisions, and ruled
unlawful issues of shares intended to interfere with the exercise
of majority shareholder’s rights in a takeover context.115 Unlike
Delaware, the common law never moved “toward a notion of
directorial responsibility tethered to the welfare of the overall
corporate enterprise.”116 In principle, the courts could have
responded to the introduction of Section 309 by changing their
approach to takeover regulation, allowing defensive measures
intended to protect the interests of employees. However, the
introduction of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in 1968
had already closed off the flow of takeover cases to the courts.117
The City Code prohibited the directors from doing anything that
might frustrate the offer or deny the shareholders the
opportunity to decide on the takeover, a far wider prohibition
113. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate
Law: Who’s in Control, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1993).
114. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 240–
48 (1991) (positing about the constituency statute’s impact on conceptions of a
director’s duty); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 35–47 (1992) (discussing the
judicial application of the duty of care and the business judgment rule).
115. See Howard Smith Ltd. . Ampol Petroleum Ltd. (1974) AC 821, 838
(appeal taken from S.C.N.S.W.) (concluding that “it must be unconstitutional for
directors to use their fiduciary powers over the shares in the company purely for
the purpose of destroying an existing majority, or creating a new majority which
did not previously exist”); Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. (1967) Ch. 254, 268 (noting
the directors would not be permitted to use their power “to interfere with the
exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights”);.
116. Johnson & Millon, supra note 113, at 1198.
117. In an exceptional takeover case, which fell outside the scope of the City
Code, the Scottish Court of Session ruled that the directors owed their duties to
the company—which encompassed present and future shareholders, as well as
employees—and not merely to the current shareholders. See Dawson Int’l plc v.
Coats Patons plc (1988) 4 BCC 305, 313 (“[T]here appears to be no reason why
‘members’ should hot [sic] be capable of applying to future as well as to present
members of the company.”).
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than that developed at common law.118 Hence, even if widening
the definition of the interests of the company in Section 309
theoretically may have given directors greater discretion in law to
defend against hostile takeovers,119 this was truncated in practice
by the City Code, which drew its force not from law, but from the
City of London’s self-regulatory capacity, with those who violated
its provisions denied access to financial services in the future.120
Accordingly, Section 309 remained, at best, as a source of
legitimation of any stakeholder management practices which had
survived the rise of the hostile takeover,121 and, at worst, a mere
“window-dressing.”122 For Sealy, it was “either one of the most
incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting on
record.”123 The section proclaimed that UK corporate law had a
wider scope, but, as a permissive provision, was effectively
redundant in practice because the forces of the wider corporate
governance system created ever greater pressure to prioritize the
short-term interests of shareholders.
Following this change, the early 1980s saw a recession and
political pressure for industrial democracy abated,124 whilst trade
118. For further discussion of the way in which the City Code superseded
the common law, see generally Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation:
Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422
(2007) (theorizing about the origins and purpose behind the advent of the City
Codes, specifically the prohibition on defensive measures).
119. For a discussion of the approach the courts might have taken where
directors sought to defend a defensive issue of shares on the basis that this was
in the interests of the employees, see Prentice, supra note 109, at 3–4 (arguing
that directors may be able to “fend off a take-over claiming that that they were
acting out of consideration for the welfare of the company’s employees”).
120. See Johnston, supra note 118, at 443 (detailing the current prohibition
on defensive measures in the London City Code).
121. For discussion of this in the context of US corporate constituency
statutes, see Orts, supra note 114, at 44 (providing support for the influence of
corporate constituency statutes in legitimating business decisions).
122. John Birds, Making Directors Do Their Duties, 1 COMPANY LAW. 67, 73
(1980).
123. Sealy, supra note 107, at 177.
124. Wedderburn, supra note 74, at 40 (“[T]he savage onslaught of the
recession stifled—whether temporarily or not we cannot know—the debate
about ‘industrial democracy’.”); see also Lord Wedderburn, Trust, Corporation
and the Worker, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 203, 249 (1985) (“When an economy, like
the British, is turned geriatric . . . the maximisation of profit leaves little space
for social experiment.”).
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unions were progressively weakened under the Thatcher
government. It was during this period that companies began to
embrace CSR in earnest,125 but the scope of company law
remained undisturbed until the Company Law Review process
which took place over a number of years at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
V. The 2006 Reforms
The review process that led to the 2006 reforms was led by a
Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG). The review was
unique in the long history of UK company law reviews in that it
began by consulting the public on the “scope” of company law, and
explicitly setting out its guiding assumptions about the purpose
of companies. Whilst CSR was not discussed, the “enlightened
shareholder value” (ESV) approach adopted by the CLRSG
implicitly assumes that corporations will be pushed by
reputational considerations to behave in a socially responsible
manner.126 The 2006 reforms were introduced at the high point of
political belief in the capacity of markets to self-regulate and to
steer business towards the public good, with the “great
moderation” coming to an abrupt end shortly afterwards with the
onset of the global financial crisis.
The CLRSG began from the position that, under the existing
law, “[c]ompanies are formed and managed for the benefit of
shareholders,” subject to safeguards for creditors, and with
“public disclosure of information” operating “for the benefit of the
community as a whole.”127 Easterbrook and Fischel were cited as
providing the main economic justification for shareholders’
ultimate control of the undertaking in the form of shareholders
125. See Daniel Kinderman, ‘Free Us up so We Can Be Responsible!’ The
Co-Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility and Neo-Liberalism in the UK,
1977–2010, 10 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 29, 29 (2012) (“As power shifted away from
unions and to employers, some prominent businessmen committed themselves
to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).”).
126. See COMPANY L. REV. STEERING GRP., MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK §§ 5.1.12, 17–23 (1999)
[hereinafter CLRSG, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK] (outlining the enlightened
shareholder value approach).
127. Id. § 5.1.4.
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having “greatest exposure to residual risk as a result of
mismanagement . . . and are therefore best qualified to ensure
proper stewardship.”128
The CLRSG contrasted ESV with two alternatives: (1) an
“exclusive focus on the short-term bottom line”; and (2) pluralism,
under which company law would require companies “to serve a
wider range of interests, not subordinate to, or as a means of
achieving, shareholder value . . . but as valid in their own
right.”129 Whilst the review rehearsed arguments akin to those of
team production theory,130 and in particular the issue of
firm-specific investments,131 it, like Blair and Stout, concluded
that company law could facilitate these developments without
radical change. ESV would “provide an adequate environment for
the development of such relationships,”132 whilst the normal
bargaining process is not “incapable of generating appropriate
safeguards.”133 Furthermore, any “deficiencies in this area . . . are
best made good by changes in other areas of the law and public
policy.”134 Pluralism, in contrast, would threaten to undermine
accountability and “dangerously distract management into a
political balancing style at the expense of economic growth and
international competitiveness.”135 After public consultation,
pluralism was ultimately rejected on the basis that a “very
substantial majority of responses (in number and in weight)
favored retaining the basic rule that directors should operate
companies for the benefit of members (ie normally shareholders),”
128. Id. at 34 n.23.
129. Id. §§ 5.1.12–13.
130. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in
Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999) (reviewing
team production theory).
131. CLRSG, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 126, § 5.1.24 (“The
pluralist view asserts that present law . . . fails to cater for these considerations,
because such firm-specific investments are best regarded as assets of the
company . . . distinct from its members.”).
132. Id. § 5.1.25.
133. Id. § 5.1.26.
134. Id. § 5.1.27. For a thorough critique of this argument, and the
assumption that “corporate law . . . is a residuary or ‘default’ intellectual field,
taking up only (and all of) what is not dealt with elsewhere,” see Johnson, supra
note 8, at 1718.
135. CLRSG, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 126, § 5.1.28.
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although “there was also very strong support for the view that
this needed to be framed in an ‘inclusive’ way.”136 Similarly, a
“substantial majority” accepted the arguments against pluralism
and opposed empowering directors to “set interests of others
above those of shareholders.”137
Having decided to implement ESV, the CLRSG recommended
a number of changes, including: (1) “an obligation on directors to
achieve the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders
by taking proper account of all the relevant considerations for
that purpose”138 (an “inclusive” duty which ultimately became
Section 172 CA 2006); (2) an obligation for large companies to
produce an Operating and Financial Review, which would provide
qualitative and “forward looking” information to the markets,
enabling them to assess the strategies adopted by the company
and the prospect of them being achieved;139 and (3) flexibility to
allow companies to define scope and purposes and, therefore, the
objectives of shareholders.140 The group hinted that reputation
would bridge the gap between ESV and pluralism,141 claiming
that the “overall objective should be pluralist in the sense that
companies should be run in a way which maximizes overall
competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all,” but without
“turning company directors from business decision makers into
moral, political or economic arbiters.”142 So in the end, there was
no significant change to company law. This was unsurprising
because, as Wedderburn noted in 1985, the argument that taking
account of a wider range of interests would produce long-term
136. COMPANY L. REV. STEERING GRP., MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK § 2.11 (2000) [hereinafter
CLRSG, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK].
137. Id. § 2.12.
138. Id. § 2.19.
139. See id. §§ 5.77–79 (discussing recommendations for the provision of
qualitative information by big companies to better inform markets).
140. See id. § 2.19 (providing that while directors would be under a duty to
obey the constitution, a wide statement of purpose would still not allow the
directors to prefer the interests of other constituencies over those of
shareholders).
141. See id. at 14 n.8 (citing the Chairman and CEO of Shell UK Ltd’s
prediction that reputation could be the “missing link” between ESV and
pluralism).
142. Id. § 2.21.
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shareholder value was “the customary British route to a
gentlemanly silence on the problem.”143
The effect of Section 172 is to require that decisions are
motivated by the directors’ honest beliefs that they will benefit
the shareholders,144 whilst the directors should “have regard” to
those other interests and considerations (whether listed or not)
which will produce the best result for the shareholders. Section
172, for the first time, enshrined shareholder primacy explicitly
in law.145 Prior to the 2006 Act, as noted above, many
commentators understood the “interests of the company” to refer
to the interests of the shareholders collectively.146 For them,
Section 172 was simply a codification of the existing law. So, for
example, Keay concludes that the section is not fit for its
purpose—to ensure that directors run companies for long-term
prosperity rather than just for short term gains—since it merely
reflects, and does no more, than the previous law.147 However, if,
143. Wedderburn, supra note 74, at 11.
144. The CLR rejected omitting a reference to the interests of “members” in
Section 172 because “it would allow directors a discretionary power to set any
interest above that of shareholders whenever their view of what constitutes ‘the
company’s success’ required it.” CLRSG, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, supra
note 136, § 3.52; see also Andrew Keay, Moving Toward Stakeholderism?
Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and More: Much Ado
About Little?, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 31 (2011) (“With directors having greater
discretion . . . directors might resist claims of breach of duty on the basis that
what they did was based on a consideration of the interests of one or more
constituencies that are mentioned in section 172.”).
145. See Talbot, supra note 10, at 515 (asserting that section 172 provides a
“bald shareholder primacy norm”). Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England
comments that “for the first time in history, shareholder primacy had been
hard-wired into companies’ statutory purposes.” See generally Andrew Haldane,
Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Who Owns a Company?, Speech at the
University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference 9 (May 22, 2015),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech8
33.pdf.
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing previous notions
of company duty).
147. See Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is
It Fit for Purpose? 13 (Univ. of Leeds Sch. of Law, Ctr. for Bus. Law & Practice,
Working
Paper,
2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1662411 (“If all [Section] 172 does is to reflect the previous duty it is not fit
for purpose as the Government had expectations that the section would achieve
more than the previous duty did.”).
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as suggested above, the “interests of the company” was never
clearly defined in the context of directors’ duties,148 then this was
a more significant change because the law became narrower and
stricter. Although Section 172 does provide directors with
guidance as to how to run the company in a way that is likely to
produce returns for shareholders in the longer term,149 they now
have a clear and unequivocal, legally-binding mandate that
shareholder interests must take priority.150
However, the importance of this change should not be
overstated for two reasons. First, the change is probably more
important on a rhetorical and ideological level than in terms of
enforcement. In principle, a decision which benefits one or more
stakeholder groups at the expense of the shareholders could be
challenged in court by one or more shareholders via a derivative
action, although this would be unlikely to succeed, both because
of the long standing implicit business judgment rule protecting
good faith decisions (in other words the directors could argue that
favoring the stakeholder group was simply an aspect of a longer
term strategy intended to produce benefits for the shareholders),
and because it would be very difficult for a complaining
shareholder to prove loss to the company for which the director is
responsible (the courts recognize that directors are hired to take
business risks in order to produce returns for the shareholders).
Second, like the original common law and Section 309 before
it, Section 172 will do little—if anything—to insulate directors
against the pressures from the wider corporate governance
system, or to steer them towards longer-term decision-making.151

148. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (describing the historic
ambiguity of the term “interests of the company”).
149. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1)(a)–(f) (UK) (listing
considerations directors should make when promoting the success of their
companies).
150. See id. § 172(1) (“A director of a company must act in the way he
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the
company for the benefit of its members as a whole . . . .”).
151. This danger was exacerbated by the abandonment of the Operating and
Financial Review, which was supposed to provide the markets with better
information in order to give directors the scope to take a long-term view, and its
replacement with a watered down Business Review and then Strategic Report.
See generally Andrew Johnston, After the OFR: Will UK Shareholder Value Still
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Although both the 2006 reforms and the 2010 soft law
Stewardship Code152 are premised upon the assumption that
shareholders will steer companies towards a long-term approach,
there are signs that, at present, shareholder engagement is
actually having the opposite effect. As Millon points out, the
chase for yield since the financial crisis means that institutional
shareholders, which conventionally assumed returns of around
8% in order to meet their liabilities, are increasing pressure on
managers to maximize quarterly returns.153 Dallas shows how
financial firms may put pressure on corporate management to
increase payouts to shareholders either by their trading
activities, which put pressure on market prices, or by the “use, or
threatened use, of their shareholder voting power.”154 To make
matters worse, the institutional investors with the longest time
frames—pension funds and insurance companies—have been
divesting from equities in favor of alternative investments such
as hedge funds and private equity, both of which take a more
activist approach to scrutinizing management, but prioritize
short term returns.155 This creates a danger that the reforms
since 2006 will actually result in greater short-termism and
further reduce the willingness of corporations voluntarily to
Be Enlightened?, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 817 (2006) (discussing the rationale
for and abandonment of the Operating and Financial Review).
152. The Stewardship Code aims to encourage shareholders to engage with
the companies in which they own shares “to promote the long term success of
companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper.”
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (2010, rev. 2012).
153. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 911, 931 (2013) (“To meet their current obligations, public pension funds
have historically assumed an annual rate of return of 8% . . . .”).
154. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264, 306–09 (2012) (detailing the use of
nonfinancial firms as “arbitrage opportunities” via threats of the exercise of
shareholder power).
155. See OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2015, ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. 120–21 (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/finance-and-investment/oecd-business-and-finance-outlook2015_9789264234291-en#.WNMQa4QppPU (last visited May 1, 2017) (showing
that UK institutional investors have, since 2008, been divesting equity holdings
and investing in “other” assets such as private equity, derivatives and
structured products in a “search for yield”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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embrace social responsibility and address the social costs their
activities create.
Decisions that do not contribute to short-term shareholder
value and that directors cannot justify in dialogue with
shareholders either informally or in general meeting will be
sanctioned by declining share prices, resulting in foregone
bonuses and the threat of hostile takeover. We saw above that,
both under the original common law and under Section 309,
which broadened the notion of the “interests of the company,” it
was arguably permissible for directors to take decisions that
benefitted employees over shareholders.156 However, both the
original common law and Section 309 were deprived of most of
their utility in terms of reinforcing managerial discretion because
markets asserted control over managers following the 1948
reforms.157 Likewise, Section 172 is unlikely to have much effect
in the context of a form of corporate governance that incentivizes
and threatens corporate directors to prioritize the short-term
financial interests of shareholders. For example, in the aftermath
of the financial crisis, it is difficult to argue that Section 172
played any meaningful role in constraining short-termism on the
part of directors, or limiting the possible impacts on third parties.
Shareholders pushed for more risk-taking on the part of banks,
and highly incentivized executives were only too happy to
oblige.158 As policymakers appear to be committed to addressing
the perceived problem of short-termism by further empowering
shareholders, Section 172 will become even less relevant as
shareholders exercise greater direct and indirect influence over
executives.159
156. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (arguing that unsettled case
law may have allowed for a wider notion of company interests).
157. See discussion supra Part III (detailing the 1948 company law reforms).
158. See Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU,
at
10
(Feb.
5,
2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/
/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (“[S]hareholders’ pressure on management to
deliver higher share prices and dividends for investors meant that exceeding
expected quarterly earnings became the benchmark . . . .”).
159. Since the financial crisis, the UK has witnessed the introduction of the
Stewardship Code, a soft law initiative, which seeks to encourage shareholder
engagement with companies. Supra note 152. In addition, a binding shareholder
vote on companies’ executive pay policies was introduced. See Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 § 79(4) (UK) (inserting § 439A into the Companies
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The reformed UK law stands in marked contrast to the
position under US law—argued by Johnson and Millon—that the
Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby provides a “highly persuasive if
not authoritative” opinion that state law is permissive.160
Therefore, “such avowed goals as social justice, environmental
concerns, and employee welfare . . . are valid ends in themselves,
not merely means toward the goal of profits.”161 In contrast to
changes in US state law that permit or require directors to
consider wider interests, Section 172 explicitly fixes shareholder
primacy as the goal of companies, restricting managerial
discretion and legitimating the wider social norm that managers
should maximize shareholder value.162 As a result of the changes
during the course of the twentieth century, which culminated in
Section 172, CSR is now confined to practices that are acceptable
to the shareholders and the capital markets. Companies’ CSR
practices have of course long reflected this, with companies

Act 2006); see also Companies Act 2006 § 439A (UK) (requiring shareholders to
approve, by ordinary resolution, the directors’ remuneration policy as detailed in
Directors’ Remuneration Report). Most recently, on December 16th, 2016,
agreement was reached within the EU on revisions to the Shareholder Rights’
Directive, requiring companies to develop binding pay policies for executives, to
be approved by the shareholders. The policy must “contribute to the business
strategy, long-term interests and sustainability of the company and explain how
it does so.” European Scrutiny Committee, Proposal for a Directive Amending
Directive 2007/36 as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder
Engagement and Directive 2013/34 as Regards Certain Elements of the
Corporate Governance Statement, COM (14) 213 (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmeuleg/71xxxi/7115.htm. At the time of going to press, the full text of the Directive was
not publicly available, but for a summary see European Council Press Release
738/16, ‘Shareholders' rights in EU companies: Presidency strikes deal with
Parliament’ (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2016/12/16-shareholders-rights-eu-companies/. For further background
on the revisions to the Shareholder Rights Directive, see FRANK BOLD,
SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS
DIRECTIVE
POLICY
BRIEF
(2016),
http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/documents/briefing-shareholder-rightsdirective.pdf.
160. Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 22 (2015).
161. Id.
162. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (UK) (“A director of a company
must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole . . . .”).
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producing glossy CSR reports that pay little attention to impacts
and are more akin to “impression management.”
VI. Conclusion: The Prospects for CSR
This Article has shown that changes to company law since
1948, and the changes to corporate governance that followed,
have gradually reduced the scope for managerial-led CSR
initiatives. More recently, however, CSR has come to be viewed in
policy and academic debates as a means of governance of
economic activity in pursuit of both economic efficiency and social
justice. This can be seen most starkly in the European
Commission’s changing definition of CSR, which moved from
purely voluntary action on the part of companies intended to
make the world a better place163 to action by companies to
address their impacts on society.164 These developments are
important conceptually, not least because a focus on impacts
ensures the “relevance” of CSR activities165 and avoids the
critique that managers who engage in charitable or philanthropic
CSR are imposing agency costs on shareholders by “not
spend[ing] the profits on CSR in precisely the way that equity
holders would have spent them.”166 Moreover, a focus on
externalities provides a clear economic efficiency rationale for
163. See Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility, at 8, COM (2001) 366 final, (July 18, 2001)
(defining CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”).
164. See A Renewed EU Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility,
Communication from the Commission, at 3, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25,
2011) (referring to CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on
society,” and requiring that corporations “have in place a process to integrate
social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their
business operations and core strategy”).
165. See Donna J. Wood, Corporate Social Performance Revisited, 16 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 691, 698 (1991) (“[P]ublic responsibility can be translated into a
broader rule of relevance.”).
166. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economic Context of Corporate Social
Responsibility, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTOR’S LIABILITIES 55, 61
(Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., De Gruyter 1985); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal and Economic
Context of a Continuing Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 114, 124 (1984).
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CSR.167 However, they also suffer from a significant omission:
they are silent on the question of when companies should address
their impacts. There is no discussion of the distinction between
“ethical” and “strategic” CSR,168 or, to put it more bluntly, there
is no guidance as to what companies should do where there is no
“business case” for internalizing an externality. The closest thing
to guidance to be found in the various policy documents is
contained in ISO 26000, which suggests that companies should
internalize their impacts where society expects them to do this,
and that successful companies are socially responsible.169 In
other words, companies will be steered by markets to internalize
their externalities to an appropriate extent, leaving us squarely
within the realms of the “business case” for CSR.170
This failure to discuss the limits of corporate responsibility
for impacts may be pragmatic, with policymakers keen not to
deter corporations from the impact agenda by emphasizing the
possibility of profit sacrifice. Likewise, CSR is no longer a matter
for management alone: the legal and policy changes during the
second half of the twentieth century progressively empowered
shareholders and became a key limiter of CSR activities. Rather
than a legal distinction between “ethical” and “strategic” CSR, it
is suggested that the key distinction in practice is now between
CSR practices that empowered shareholders will tolerate, and
those that they will not tolerate.
167. See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost: The Real
Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221, 239 (2011)
(arguing that voluntary identification and internalization of externalities is
another way of governing them, alongside taxes, regulation and Coasean
bargaining). For a more sceptical view of the usefulness of the externality
concept, see generally Claire A. Hill, The Rhetoric of Negative Externalities, 39
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 517 (2016) (asserting that there are serious questions as to
how it should be operationalized).
168. Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 30 (assessing the various
motivations behind a corporation’s interest in CSR).
169. See ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, INTERNAL ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (last
visited May 1, 2017) (“Business and organization do not operate in a vacuum.
Their relationship to the society and environment in which they operate is a
critical factor in their ability to continue to operate effectively.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
170. See Andrew Johnston, ISO 26000: Guiding Companies to Sustainability
Through Social Responsibility?, 9 EUR. COMPANY L. 110, 117 (2012) (evaluating
the ISO’s focus on “business benefits” as a way to encourage CSR).
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Looking at the practice of large corporations, it appears that
shareholders will tolerate CSR activities that are either
inexpensive, or that managers can credibly claim will result in
direct benefits to shareholders (perhaps because they are a core
part of the strategy or because there is a clearly perceived
reputational benefit to a particular corporation),171 or, ideally,
both. Beyond this, there is not much scope for CSR that reduces
profitability in order to internalize externalities. This has long
been recognized by economists, who argue that a corporation that
wants to engage in CSR activities, but is operating in competitive
markets, facing the same cost functions as its competitors and
elastic demand for its products, will have to “either raise its
prices, and face a drastic decline in demand for its products, or it
must reduce the returns to capital or labor.”172 Consumers may be
willing to pay a higher price for a product that is marketed on the
basis of its CSR characteristics, although the evidence is that this
willingness is patchy.173 Moreover, with households highly
indebted, inflation barely above zero in many Western economies,
and myriad products competing for spare household cash flow, it
seems unlikely that CSR will expand on the basis of consumer
market pressure. With returns to labor slashed during the long
period of offshoring of production that has characterized
globalization since the 1980s, there is little scope for companies to
address their social and environment impacts by further cutting
returns to labor. As a result of the reforms discussed in this
Article, companies are under considerable market pressure to
maximize shareholder value, making it very difficult to reduce to
returns to shareholders in the absence of far-reaching reforms to
the scope of corporate law and takeover regulation. Similarly,
returns to senior executives might be reduced, but this seems
unlikely without significant reforms to the composition of
remuneration committees.

171. See Johnston, supra note 167, at 222 (describing the “business case for
CSR” as promoting a “win-win” in which “corporations are seen as ‘doing good,’”
thereby enhancing their reputation).
172. Mashaw, supra note 166, at 60.
173. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 47–49 (2005) (detailing the
tension between a consumer’s desire to contribute to socially responsible
companies and their desire to purchase more affordable products).
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The result is that CSR has effectively been reduced to either
a marketing or defensive exercise,174 and cannot become either a
comprehensive mechanism for governing externalities175 or even
a credible means of legitimating corporate capitalism in the face
of its impacts on society.176 This leads to the pessimistic
conclusion that, under current political economic conditions (i.e.,
quantitative easing, zero interest rate policy, household
indebtedness, large pension fund liabilities and activist
shareholders), companies will not voluntarily take decisions
which further sustainability. Hence, there is a pressing need to
identify the “countervailing forces” that will create pressure for
true social responsibility.177 A broader mandate to consider
sustainability in decision-making,178 coupled with wider powers of
appointment and representation on corporate boards, would be
one way of steering companies towards taking account of the
social and environmental costs of their activities.
What, then, is the prospect of reforms in the UK that would
steer companies towards greater social responsibility? Until
174. See Marc T. Jones, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Critique of the
Social Responsibility Concept and Discourse, 35 BUS. & SOC’Y 7, 29 (1996)
(describing corporate CSR budgets as funding activities which are “essentially
high-profile public relations advertisements that the organization uses to
differentiate itself from its competitors and pre-empt government regulations”).
175. As Reich put it, capital markets are “notoriously impatient, and are
becoming less patient all the time. Most of today’s institutional investors have
no particular interest in a ‘long term’ that extends much beyond the next
quarter, if that long.” Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 40 CAL. MGMT. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
176. See Wood, supra note 165, at 695–96 (exploring the principle behind
societal grants of “legitimacy” on businesses); Jones, supra note 174, at 7–8
(discussing a capitalist society’s need to justify negative externalities in the
market place).
177. See Jones, supra note 174, at 34 (“[T]o propose that business
organization will behave in a socially responsible manner as the result of
external pressure . . . is a very different, more theoretically plausible and
empirically sustainable position.”).
178. See Beate Sjåfjell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen & David
Millon, Shareholder Primacy: the Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies, in
COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 126,
146–47 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015) (“[N]ational
companies acts should state that the societal purpose of companies is to create
sustainable value within the planetary boundaries. Such a redefined purpose of
companies would need to be operationalised through integration of such a goal
into the duties of the board.”).
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recently, there was little likelihood of such a change, with the
“classic argument” for single constituency accountability holding
a firm grip on policymakers, despite its “bracketing” effects.
However, this Article can end on a positive note by pointing to
tentative signs of change in the wake of the UK’s referendum
decision to leave the European Union. Surprisingly, given its
historical opposition to the EU’s attempts to widen the scope of
corporate governance, the UK is now considering far-reaching
changes to corporate governance, including the reconstitution of
boards and remuneration committees to include employee
representatives. During her campaign to become Prime Minister
in the aftermath of Brexit, Theresa May stated, “I want to see
changes in the way that big business is governed . . . . So if I’m
Prime Minister, we’re going to change that system—and we’re
going to have not just consumers represented on company boards,
but employees as well.”179 An initial Parliamentary inquiry was
launched in September 2016,180 and the new Prime Minister
announced that plans to put both consumers and workers on
boards would be published before the end of the year.181 However,
this commitment was withdrawn shortly afterwards.182 A Green
179. Theresa May, Member of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS, We Can
Make Britain a Country that Works for Everyone (July 11, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
180. See Corporate Government Inquiry Launched, COMMONS SELECT COMM.
(Sep. 16, 2016), http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-az/commons-select/business-innovation-and-skills/news-parliament2015/corporate-governance-inquiry-launch-16-17/ (last visited May 1, 2017)
(“The . . . Committee has today launched an inquiry on corporate governance,
focussing [sic] on executive pay, directors duties, and the composition of
boardrooms, including worker representation and gender balance in executive
positions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Corporate
Governance
Inquiry—Publications,
PARLIAMENT,
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/
business-energy-industrial-strategy/inquiries/parliament-2015/corporate-gover
nance-inquiry/publications/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (tracking the responses to
the consultation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. See Theresa May, Prime Minister, U.K., Keynote Speech at
Conservative Party Conference (Oct. 5, 2016).
182. Theresa May, Keynote Speech to Confederation of British Industry
(Nov. 21, 2016) (“While it is important that the voices of workers and consumers
should be represented, I can categorically tell you that this is not about
mandating works councils, or the direct appointment of workers or trade union
representatives on boards . . . .”); see also Helen Warrell & Jim Pickard, Plan for
UK to Put Workers on Company Boards Falters, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016),
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Paper on Corporate Governance Reform followed in November
2016, 183 canvassing, among other things, different possibilities
for the representation of stakeholder interests within corporate
governance,
including
“stakeholder
advisory
panels,”184
designating non-executive directors “to ensure that the voices of
key interested groups, especially that of employees, is [sic] being
heard at board level,”185 and strengthening reporting
requirements.186 However, direct stakeholder representation on
boards would remain a voluntary matter, with the Government
“not proposing mandate the direct appointment of employees or
other interested parties to company boards.”187
In brief, post-Brexit, and following other recent scandals that
have undermined public trust in the way large companies are
governed,188 UK corporate governance policy is now highly
unpredictable. The current status quo is unlikely to persist, and
limited reforms that broaden the scope of corporate law now look
possible. Reforms that embed wider social responsibilities in law
would represent a marked improvement on the current
https://www.ft.com/content/22128636-9ece-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2 (last visited
May 1, 2017) (reporting that ministers are “looking at ways to water down
Theresa May’s pledge”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
183. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, GREEN PAPER, supra note 17, at
34–42.
184. Id.at 38–39.
185. Id. at 39–40.
186. Id. at 40–41.
187. Id. at 40.
188. To give two recent examples, BHS, a privately-held chain of clothing
stores, failed in June 2016 with a pension fund deficit of £571m. See Mark
Vandevelde & Kate Allen, Philip Green Pays £363m into Stricken BHS Pension
Fund, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d62e97d0-fdc511e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). Sports Direct, a chain of listed sports apparel stores
admitted using “potentially oppressive” workplace practices, and, under
considerable political pressure, agreed voluntarily to put an employee
representative on the board. See Nathalie Thomas, Sports Direct Admits some
Work Policies are “Potentially Oppressive”, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/6b10a343-cb80-3c98-b4e2-4607ad3437a9 (last visited
May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Mark
Vandevelde, Sports Direct to Appoint Worker Representative to Board, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d4d713ca-04ab-11e7-ace01ce02ef0def9 (last visited May 1 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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constrained voluntarist approach to CSR. They would make it
more likely that companies will take greater responsibility for the
impacts on society, reversing some of the legal changes that, since
1948, have greatly reduced the scope of CSR.

